Donielle Hoist v. State of New Jersey by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-18-2016 
Donielle Hoist v. State of New Jersey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Donielle Hoist v. State of New Jersey" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 172. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/172 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PS5-074        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3038 
___________ 
 
DONIELLE T. HOIST, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;  
DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL OF PROTECTION AGENCY;  
DEBRA EWALT; ROSANNE ROSSI;  
VERONICA KIRKHAM; KAREN SONDEJ;  
MATTHEW COEFER; WAYNE GRENNIER; DOES;  
JOHN DOES; KRISTINA CLAYTON;  
EVELYN MOLDER; PATRICIA SCOTT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-05370) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 16, 2016 
Before:  JORDAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 18, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Donielle T. Hoist, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants in her employment discrimination lawsuit.  We will affirm. 
 The procedural history of this case and the details of Hoist’s claims are well 
known to the parties, are set forth in the District Court’s opinion, and need not be 
discussed at length.  Briefly, Hoist was employed by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) from 2004 until 2011, when she was terminated 
following an April 2011 altercation with her co-worker.  Although a disciplinary hearing 
officer determined that Hoist had instigated the altercation and had been the aggressor, 
Hoist believed that she was terminated because she is African-American and in retaliation 
for having made prior complaints about her work environment.  As a result, Hoist filed a 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  After the EEOC 
issued a right-to-sue letter, Hoist commenced an action in the District Court, naming as 
Defendants the DEP and several state employees.   
 In April 2014, Hoist filed a third amended complaint, alleging race and gender 
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  Following discovery, the 
parties filed cross-motions motions for summary judgment.  In a thorough opinion, the 
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District Court granted the Defendants’ summary judgment motion and denied Hoist’s.1  
Hoist appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and view all inferences drawn from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Montone v. City of 
Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper only if the 
record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 As an initial matter, we agree with the District Court that Hoist did not exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to her gender discrimination claim.  Indeed, she did 
not bring that claim to the attention of the EEOC, and it did not fall within the scope of 
her charge alleging racial discrimination.  See Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 
F.2d 394, 398-99 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that “the parameters of the civil action in the 
district court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be 
expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”) (citations omitted).  Thus, the 
claim was properly dismissed.2   
                                              
1 The District Court also denied in that order three motions to compel discovery that had 
been filed by Hoist.  To the extent Hoist challenges the decision to deny those motions, 
we have reviewed the District Court’s reasons for denying those motions and perceive no 
error on the part of the District Court. 
 
2 The District Court also correctly dismissed Hoist’s state law tort claims, which she 
raised for the first time in her summary judgment motion.  Even if Hoist had presented 
those claims in her third amended complaint, they were subject to dismissal because 
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 We analyze Hoist’s other discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII 
according to the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 
192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Hoist 
bore the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.  See 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If she succeeded, the burden then would shift to 
the Defendants to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her 
termination.  See id.  Hoist would then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by the Defendants 
was a pretext.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). 
We need not address whether Hoist made out a prima facie case of discrimination 
or retaliation because we agree with the District Court that, even if she had done so, the 
Defendants articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, which 
Hoist failed to rebut.  As mentioned, the Defendants proffered that they terminated Hoist 
because of her April 2011 altercation with a co-worker.3  As the District Court noted, 
Hoist’s conduct during that incident violated section 4A:2-2.3(a)6 of the New Jersey 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hoist did not comply with the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  
See N.J. Stat. Ann § 59:8-8; Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1246 (N.J. 
2004). 
 
3 The District Court correctly noted that Hoist appeared to provoke a possible physical 
altercation during that incident.  Indeed, witnesses to the incident (which included outside 
vendors) informed a disciplinary officer that Hoist had yelled “If you see a bitch, slap a 
bitch” several times within inches of her co-worker’s face. 
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Administrative Code, which permits the discipline of public employees for “[c]onduct 
unbecoming a public employee.”  See N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.3(a)6.  The Defendants also 
submitted evidence showing that Hoist had an extensive history of aggressive and 
unprofessional behavior (dating back to 2007) which resulted in her inability to get along 
with her co-workers.   
Hoist has not produced a material issue of fact demonstrating that the Defendants’ 
proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for discrimination.  To establish 
pretext under the summary judgment standard, a plaintiff must either (1) offer evidence 
that “casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant 
so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication,” or (2) 
present evidence sufficient to support an inference that “discrimination was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”  Fuentes 
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994).  To meet that burden, a plaintiff “cannot 
simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.”  Id. at 765. 
Hoist attempts to cast doubt on the Defendants’ proffered reason for terminating 
her by noting that the co-worker with whom she had the altercation did not receive 
punishment for her role in the incident.  Hoist believes that her co-worker was not 
disciplined because her co-worker is Caucasian.  As the District Court explained, 
however, Hoist’s co-worker did, in fact, receive a written warning for her use of 
inappropriate language during the altercation.  Further, Hoist does not account for the fact 
that her co-worker was found to have had a lesser role the incident.  In sum, Hoist 
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pointed to no evidence suggesting, nor do we find any reason to conclude, that the 
Defendants terminated her employment for reasons other than those which they have 
proffered. 
 We also agree with the District Court that Hoist failed to establish her hostile work 
environment claim.  A Title VII hostile work environment claim requires proof of 
pervasive or severe discrimination that affected the plaintiff and would also affect a 
reasonable person.  See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 
1994).  For the reasons carefully identified by the District Court, there is insufficient 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the incidents 
Hoist relied upon to support her claim were sufficiently severe or pervasive.  Summary 
judgment was therefore appropriate. 
 We have considered Hoist’s various arguments and conclude that none has merit.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
